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STATEMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE INTEREST
Amicus Curiae Landmark Legal Foundation is a national public interest law
firm committed to preserving the principles of limited government, separation of
powers, federalism, strict construction of the Constitution and individual rights.
Specializing in Constitutional history and litigation, Landmark presents herein a
unique perspective concerning the legal issues and national implications of the
district court’s improper application of federal preemption and facial constitutional
challenge standards and improper application of statutory construction principles.
This brief is filed with the consent of the parties.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
 This case is about individual liberty, state sovereignty and federalism.  
Indeed, whether there remain any limits on the power and reach of the federal 
government is the fundamental question before this Court.  Appellant's defense of 
the individual mandate,
1
 if accepted, requires the Court to disregard more than 220 
years of Commerce Clause application and Supreme Court precedence, 
fundamentally misapply the Necessary and Proper Clause and disregard the 
Constitution's requirements for the laying and collection of taxes.   
The heavy-handed demands of temporary politicians who seek to change 
fundamentally and permanently the relationship between the citizen and 
government in a manner that no past Congress or Executive have undertaken and 
which the Constitution clearly does not allow must not be given the Court‟s 
imprimatur.  The District Court correctly rejected the individual mandate and its 
penalty provision as unconstitutional. Amicus Curiae Landmark Legal Foundation 
 
urges this Court to uphold the District Court and to accept this brief, which 
presents a unique and valuable perspective not found in the Parties‟ briefs.   
 The Commerce Clause is written in uncomplicated, plain English.  Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution provides that “The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
                                                 
1
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.L.No. 111-148, Section 1501, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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the Indian Tribes.”  Congress can tax interstate commerce, regulate interstate 
commerce, and can even prohibit certain types of interstate commerce.  There is 
nothing in the history of this Nation, let alone the history of the Constitution and 
the Commerce Clause, however, permitting the federal government to compel an 
individual to enter into a legally binding private contract against the individual‟s 
will and interests simply because the individual is living and breathing.  Such a 
radical departure from precedent, law, and logic has never been contemplated, let 
alone imposed upon, the American people.
2
  
Appellant's alternative argument disguises an unprecedented national police 
power as part of a “comprehensive regulatory program” permissible under the 
                                                 
2
 The federal government‟s flagship case, Wickard v. Filburn, 311 U.S. 111 (1942) 
in no way supports the PPACA‟s individual mandate.  In fact, it underscores its 
unconstitutionality.  In that case, the government did not mandate a farmer to grow 
wheat.  It sought to regulate the wheat the farmer, by his own free will, chose to 
grow.  Herein lies the obstacle the government cannot overcome.  Under the 
federal government‟s logic justifying a congressional power to compel private 
individuals to initiate private economic activity, what would stop the government 
from compelling a farmer to grow wheat or to grow corn or to raise livestock or to 
undertake some other activity he has no intention of pursuing?  Indeed what would 
stop the federal government from compelling any private individual to participate 
in agricultural activities or any other private activities?  And once unleashed, what 
are the limits to this new, unconstitutional grant of power?  Can the federal 
government compel an individual to purchase certain fruits and vegetables that are 
said to be healthy in order to limit the federal treasury‟s exposure to health-care 
related costs?  Having so thoroughly contorted the Commerce Clause with its 
specious reasoning that it would swallow the Constitution and fundamentally 
change the relationship between the citizen and the federal government, should not 
the federal government provide some explanation respecting the contours of this 
new authority it claims?  Perhaps this Court will make such an inquiry of the 
government. 
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Necessary and Proper Clause.  The Necessary and Proper Clause, however, does 
not create any additional congressional power, nor does it expand any enumerated 
power.  See Joseph Story, "A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United 
States," (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1986), Section 208.  Accordingly, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause does not save the individual mandate as Congress 
never has had the authority to compel private parties to initiate private economic 
activity in anticipation of some future potential private healthcare need.  See 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, quoting 
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942)).   
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the mandate's penalty provision is a 
tax, despite all evidence to the contrary, it would still violate the Apportionment 
Clause as well as the taxing power of Article I, Section 8 and the 16th Amendment.  
ARGUMENT 
 
I. THE PPACA’S INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MANDATE IS AN 
UNPRECEDENTED AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLICE POWER 
IMPERMISSIBLE UNDER EITHER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
OR THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE. 
 
 A. The Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause in  
  Historical Perspective. 
 
 In the wake of the Revolutionary War the Nation was on the brink of 
financial disaster.  The central government was largely without substantive 
authority and in disarray.  With the Articles of Confederation ineffective in 
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practice, leaders from the several states gathered in Philadelphia at the Federal 
Convention of 1787 to address the Articles‟ many defects.  Among their most 
pressing concerns was dealing with the Confederacy‟s inability to effectively 
construct a stable national economy. 
The want of [the] power to regulate commerce was . . . a leading defect of 
the Confederation.  In the different States, the most opposite and conflicting 
regulations existed; each pursued its own real or supposed local interests; 
each was jealous of the rivalry of its neighbors; and each was successively 
driven to retaliatory measures, in order to satisfy public clamor, or to 
alleviate private distress.  In the end, however, all their measures became 
utterly nugatory, or mischievous, engendering mutual hostilities, and 
prostrating all their commerce at the feet of foreign nations.  It is hardly 
possible to exaggerate the oppressed and degraded state of domestic 
commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution.   
 
Story, "A Familiar Exposition," at Section 163. 
 
 James Madison noted that the predatory and retaliatory taxation visited on 
some states by their neighbors resulted in “New Jersey, placed between 
Philadelphia & N. York, [being] likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and N. 
Carolina, between Virginia & S. Carolina to a patient bleeding at both arms.”  
James Madison, "Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787," (Athens, 
OH: Ohio University Press, 1985) p. 7.  Prior to adoption of the new constitution, 
the regulation of commerce “never ceased to be a source of dissatisfaction & 
discord . . ..”  Id.   
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"Commerce," at the time the Constitution and its Commerce Clause were 
drafted and ratified, "consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as 
transporting for these purposes.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) 
(Thomas, J. concurring.) Not only was the customary meaning of “commerce” well 
understood, the Framers‟ usage of the term is well documented.     
 As Robert H. Bork and Daniel E. Troy have observed from the historical 
record “„commerce‟ does not seem to have been used during the founding era to 
refer to those acts that precede the act of trade.  Interstate commerce seems to 
refer to interstate trade – that is, commerce is „intercourse for the purposes of trade 
in any and all forms, including the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of 
commodities between the . . . citizens of different States.”  Bork and Troy, 
Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power to Regulate Commerce, 
25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol‟y 849, 864 (2002) (internal citations omitted; emphasis 
added in part).   
 Giles Jacob's "New Law Dictionary," (10th Ed. 1782) -- the Black's Law 
Dictionary of the Framers' day -- defined "commerce" as "traffic, trade or 
merchandize in buying and selling of goods." (Available at 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/ezproxy.mnl.umkc.edu/servlet/ECCO.)  These 
concepts contemplate interactions consisting of activity freely engaged in by 
individuals in the marketplace.  In short, the Framers understood that there needed 
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to be a unified national authority for regulating the flow of goods.  The Supreme 
Court's historic 1824 Commerce Clause decision, Gibbons v. Ogden, demonstrated 
that the Framers intended for the Constitution to mean what it says.  
 B. The District Court Correctly Applied Gibbons v. Ogden. 
 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), is the preeminent 
Commerce Clause decision of the founding era.  The District Court's holding -- 
that the power to regulate commerce has never been understood to include the 
power to compel commerce -- is grounded in a thorough analysis of Gibbons that 
warrants emphasis. 
The issue in Gibbons was whether the Commerce Clause power included the 
power to regulate navigation.  The case, which became known as “the 
emancipation proclamation for American commerce,” involved the question as to 
whether individual states could grant monopolies for access to their navigational 
waters.  See Jean Edward Smith, "John Marshall: Definer of a Nation," New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, Inc. 1996), 474.  New York, New Jersey and 
Connecticut were on the brink of civil war over New York‟s refusal to allow any 
ships or other navigational transports access to the state‟s ports or harbors other 
than those owned by New York's designees.  The result was escalated transport 
fees to neighboring states, confiscation of unlicensed vessels and dangerously 
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heightened tensions between New York and its neighboring states.  See Gibbons, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 184-185.   
A national crisis was averted by the Supreme Court's plain reading of the 
Commerce Clause -- 
All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 
„commerce‟ to comprehend navigation.  It was so understood, and must have 
been so understood, when the constitution was framed.  The power over 
commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which 
the people of America adopted their government, and must have been 
contemplated in forming it.  The Convention must have used the word in 
that sense; because all have understood it in that sense, and the attempt to 
restrict it comes too late.”  Id. at 190. 
 
As noted by the District Court, the Constitution, including the Commerce 
Clause, must be read in its proper historical context.   See Opinion at 20-21.  And 
in Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall held that the Commerce Clause stands for the 
principle of open commerce between and among the states.   Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 
190.  Any notion that Gibbons supports the proposition that an individual can be 
compelled by the federal government to initiate private commerce is false.
3
  See 
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 606 (1827).  See also, Gary L. McDowell, "The 
                                                 
3
 Amicus Curiae Senator Harry Reid, et al., argue that Congress has had the 
plenary power since Gibbons to enact provisions such as the individual mandate.  
However, Senator Reid's brief reaches this false conclusion through a contorted 
paraphrasing of the decision, which obscures the importance of what was in truth 
the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that Congress' powers, while limited to 
those enumerated by the Constitution, are plenary to those powers enumerated.  
See Doc. No. 104. 
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Language of Law and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism," (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 313 n.5.  
C. The Supreme Court's Modern Jurisprudence Does Not Sustain 
The Individual Mandate. 
 
Appellant argues that the individual mandate is permissible under the 
Supreme Court's analysis in Gonzales v. Raich recognizing Congress's broad 
authority to “regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”   
Appellant's Brief, 24 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17).  Where there is 
literally no commerce, however, there can be nothing to regulate.  By applying the 
Supreme Court‟s “substantial effects on commerce” test in boilerplate fashion to 
the wrong “activities,” Appellant sidesteps limits on the Commerce Clause as 
recognized in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison.  The federal 
government asserts these cases support the PPACA because the underlying 
legislation in Lopez and Morrison did not regulate “economic causation.”  See 
Appellant's Brief, 46.  The irony of this position is lost on the federal government, 
which now asks this Court to re-write the Commerce Clause to define the 
individual mandate as commerce when, in fact, there is no commerce but for the 
government unconstitutionally compelling individuals to enter into private, legally 
binding contracts against their will.   
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1. The Individual Mandate Cannot Survive Commerce Clause 
Scrutiny. 
 
a. Inactivity is not activity. 
 
 Appellant's  Commerce Clause analysis is dependent on this Court accepting 
that an individual‟s decision not to purchase health insurance, i.e., inactivity,  
substantially affects interstate commerce.  Appellant's Brief, 27 (citing Raich, 545 
U.S. at 16 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942))).  But in Raich and 
Wickard, individuals actually produced or possessed a tangible product for which 
there was a market, legal or illegal.  In the instant matter, the individual is not 
creating a product or producing a service.  He is not doing anything.  Therefore, 
the individual is withholding nothing from commerce because there is no 
commerce involving the individual.   
 In Wickard, the farmer grew wheat, which he withheld from interstate 
commerce.  The Court rationalized in Wickard and later reinforced in Raich, that 
withholding wheat from interstate commerce disrupted the federal price scheme 
and thus was subject to regulation.  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.  The current matter 
has nothing to do with Wickard or Raich.   It is the insurance company that creates 
the product or service, much like the farmer who grows wheat in his field or the 
criminal who grows marijuana is her basement.  No one disputes that insurance 
companies are subject to reasonable regulation.  But the individual who is the 
target of the federal government‟s mandate is not providing any service or good; he 
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is merely existing.  In neither Wickard nor Raich did the federal government 
attempt to compel any individual to purchase wheat or marijuana. 
b. The decision to forego insurance constitutes 
 inactivity. 
 
The federal government‟s conception of health care is not one where 
millions of citizens each exercise their individual judgment to make separate and 
rational decisions on how to manage their own particular health and welfare.  
Rather, the federal government sees Americans as "groups" and "classes" to be 
regulated.  However, this is not Plato‟s Republic, Thomas More‟s Utopia, Thomas 
Hobbes‟s Leviathan, or Karl Marx‟s Workers' Paradise.    It is a constitutional 
republic where individuals are free to decide for themselves whether to participate 
in commerce or not.  By any objective standard, the individual who foregoes 
purchasing health insurance has made a decision not to engage in commerce.     
2. The Individual Mandate Is Not Saved By The Necessary 
And Proper Clause. 
 
   a. The Necessary And Proper Clause Is Restrained. 
 Early on, the Supreme Court made clear that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause does not expand Congressional power.  As Chief Justice Marshall 
explained in McColloch v. Maryland, the first inquiry must be whether a legislative 
end is constitutional and legitimate, i.e., whether it flows from an enumerated 
power.  McColloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421(1819).  Next, the means must be 
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“appropriate” and “plainly adapted” to that enumerated end.  Moreover, these 
means may not be otherwise “prohibited” and must be “consistent with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution.”  These phrases are not merely fluff as demonstrated 
in, inter alia, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) and New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  Printz affirmed that a law is not “‟proper for carrying 
into Execution the Commerce Clause‟” “[w]hen [it] violates [a constitutional] 
principle of state sovereignty.”  Printz, supra, at 923-924; see also New York, 
supra, at 166; Raich, at 39 (Scalia, J. concurring.).   
The question for this Court is not whether compelling an individual to 
purchase an insurance policy as required by the PPACA is necessary to the 
successful implementation of the PPACA.  Rather, the question is whether it is 
appropriate and plainly adapted to an enumerated federal power for the federal 
government to require an individual to purchase a good or service from another 
individual or private entity for any private purpose regardless of whether or not 
that purpose is necessary for carrying into execution a broad federal government 
program. 
The relevant question for analyzing the individual mandate under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is whether the mandate is “‟reasonably adapted‟ to 
the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.”  Raich, at 37 
(citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-119 (1941)).  What constitutes a 
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“reasonably adapted” means – and the potential for congressional mischief in 
asserting federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause – has been a 
recurring concern since the Framing.   
 It is clear that Congress had myriad constitutional ways to legislate a health 
care regime that would have achieved its intended purposes.  The individual 
mandate is not one of them.  Rather than damage permanently our constitutional 
construct by unleashing both intended and unintended consequences that 
fundamentally alter the nature of this Republic, Congress must be required to 
consider legislative alternatives that do no violence to the Constitution while 
advancing the legislature's policy and political objectives. 
   b. United States v. Comstock Reaffirms Limits On   
    Necessary And Proper Clause. 
 
 Appellant points to the Supreme Court‟s recent Necessary and Proper Clause 
examination in United States v. Comstock as justification for the individual 
mandate.  Appellant's Brief, 34.  Comstock employed a five-part test for evaluating 
legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause question in that case, the 
Supreme Court, however, still looks to McColloch v. Maryland to “define the 
scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause”: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be 
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the 
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letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."  Comstock, 2010 LEXIS 
3879, at *15 (quoting McColloch, 17 U.S. at 421). 
 Applying the “means-ends” rational relationship principle developed by the 
Supreme Court‟s Necessary and Proper Clause cases, the Comstock Court used a 
five part test to evaluate a federal civil commitment statute, which the Supreme 
Court upheld.  However, application of the Comstock test correctly led the District 
Court to a different result.  
 First, the Necessary and Proper Clause confirms Congress's broad authority 
to enact federal legislation.  While Amicus Curiae rejects strongly the propriety of 
federalizing the health care system, that issue is not before this Court.  Second, the 
Comstock civil commitment statute constituted a “modest addition to a set of 
federal prison-related mental-health statutes that have existed for many decades.”  
Id. at *20.  In this case, Congress is proposing to exercise a radically new national 
police power, one the Constitution does not grant.  Third, “Congress reasonably 
extended its longstanding civil commitment system to cover mentally ill and 
sexually dangerous persons who are already in federal custody . . . .”  Id. at *28.  
Again, here the Congress creates an unprecedented, entirely new coercive power.  
Fourth, the statute properly accounts for state interests.  Id. at *31.  Not so here.  In 
fact, the unprecedented number of states challenging the constitutionality of the 
statute in the instant action speaks volumes on the point.  Fifth, the links between 
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the civil commitment statute and “an enumerated Article I power are not too 
attenuated.  Neither is the statutory provision too sweeping in its scope.”  Id. at 
*34-35.  Here the link between the mandatory individual insurance provision, 
which creates a sweeping unprecedented power, and any enumerated power is non-
existent. 
 The PPACA thus fails the Necessary and Proper Clause tests set forth both 
in McColloch v. Maryland and Comstock.  As Justice Kennedy explained in his 
Comstock concurrence, when the inquiry is whether a federal law has sufficient 
links to an enumerated power to be within the scope of federal authority, the 
analysis depends not on the number of links, but the strength of the chain.  Id. at 
*42.  In this case, the District Court properly concluded that the link to federal 
authority is illusory and thus the law violates the Constitution.  “Simply because 
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce does not necessarily make it so.”  Id. at *45 (citing Lopez). 
 D. The Individual Mandate Is An Unconstitutional National Police 
 Power. 
 
 The insurance mandate provision and its penalty provision establish the kind 
of national police power the U. S. Supreme Court has always rejected.  "[W]e 
always have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal 
power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power; our cases are quite 
clear that there are real limits to federal power.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
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549, 584 (Thomas, J. concurring) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
155 (1992).)   
 “By assigning the Federal Government power over „certain enumerated 
objects only,‟ the Constitution „leaves to the several States a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.‟  The Federalist No. 39 (J. Madison).  
The purpose of this design is to preserve the „balance of power between the States 
and the Federal Government . . . [that] protect[s] our fundamental liberties.‟”  
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___ (2010), 2010 LEXIS 3879, at *92-93 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
 The federal government's arguments twist a pretzel out of the enumerated 
interstate commerce power – one where marketplace inactivity becomes 
marketplace activity in order to justify the exercise of an obvious police power to 
compel individual, private conduct.  As such, the government seeks not the 
appropriate use of its police power but, instead, unfettered police power, the limits 
of which the government itself cannot even define. 
 NEVER in this country‟s history have these "certain enumerated objects" 
included the power to command private individuals solely because of their status 
as a human being to buy any good or service from another private citizen or entity.  
We are aware of no federal constitutional provision, statute, or regulation so 
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commanding.  And we are aware of no example heretofore when any federal 
governmental body even attempted such an abuse of authority. 
 American history is replete with government efforts to influence the free 
market through a laundry list of incentives and disincentives.  It has become a 
common practice largely upheld by the courts.  Taxes, surtaxes, excise taxes, tax 
credits, tax deductions, tax abatements – all designed to influence commerce while 
funding government operations.  Myriad federal and state regulations, county and 
municipal zoning ordinances, and a variety of other government influences affect 
private market decisions Americans make literally millions of times every day.  
Importantly, they do not mandate that private citizens enter into legally binding 
contracts to purchase goods or services from other private citizens or entities.  This 
further demonstrates the radical departure from history and law demanded by this 
current government in its brief.   
 Moreover, it should be emphasized that even where the federal government 
has required citizens to pay a portion of their earnings into government run benefit 
programs such as Social Security and Medicare, the payments have been in the 
form of defined taxes.  See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 635 (1937).  Here, as 
explained below, Congress specifically avoided that constitutional route.  
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II. SECTION 5000A OF THE PPACA ESTABLISHES AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX. 
  
 The District Court's determination that the individual mandate penalty is not 
a tax is rock solid.  The federal government's argument on appeal that Congress has 
the power to lay a tax on the individual for not taking any action, in contrast, is 
based on a murky reading of the General Welfare Clause.  There is no attempt to 
analyze and/or justify Section 5000A of the PPACA (“penalty provision”) within 
the constitutional constraints set forth in Article I, § 9, cl. 4 (prohibition on the 
issuance of capitation or direct taxes unless apportioned among the states) or the 
16
th
 Amendment (income tax).  Nor does the federal government attempt to justify 
this provision as a permissible excise tax (Article I, § 8).  Even if the District 
Court's conclusion was erroneous, the penalty provision fails all constitutional tests 
for permissible taxation. 
 Since this penalty provision exceeds congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause, the federal government seeks to justify this provision as proper 
under congressional authority to lay and collect taxes.  Briefly summarized, the 
federal government argues Congress may use its “comprehensive” authority under 
the Constitution‟s General Welfare Clause to lay a “tax” upon individuals who 
purchase no product, realize no gain on investment, or receive no income from 
their labors.  Appellant's Brief, 50.            
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A careful analysis of congressional power to lay and collect taxes under the 
Constitution and relevant case law provides no support for Section 5000A.  The 
penalty provision lies outside the scope of congressional authority and should be 
declared invalid.  The federal government‟s arguments that this provision 
constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress‟s taxation authority fail under all 
established precedents and should be rejected by the Court.   
A. The Penalty Provision Is Not A Constitutional Excise Tax. 
 
The penalty provision fails the Constitution's excise tax requirements.
4
  
Excise taxes require some sort of action or activity on the part of the individual to 
be assessed.  Professor Steven J. Willis and Mr. Nakku Chung cogently describe an 
excise tax in the following manner, “[an excise tax] involves something an obligor 
chose to do: purchase a product or service, use a product or service, transfer 
property, or conduct commercial activity.”  Steven J. Willis and Nakku Chung, 
“Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare,” 2010 TNT 133-6, July 13, 2010.      
Traditionally, excise taxes flow from the funds or income derived from a 
particular business activity.  The Supreme Court, in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 
upheld, as a valid excise tax, employers‟ Social Security contributions based partly 
                                                 
4
 The Joint Committee on Taxation labels the penalty provision an “Excise Tax on 
Individuals.”  See Joint Comm. On Taxation, 111th Cong., Technical Explanation 
of the Revenue Provisions of the “Reconciliation Act of 2010,” as amended, in 
Combination with the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” 31, Errata For 
JCX-18-10, 2 (Mar. 21, 2010, Errata published May 4, 2010).   Simply labeling it 
an excise is not the test for constitutionality. 
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on the rationale that “employment is a business relation, if not itself a business.”  
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937).   
Accordingly, a tax on the proceeds from the sale of a mining property is 
considered an excise because the income derived flowed from the operation of a 
specific business.  “The very process of mining is, in a sense, equivalent in its 
results to a manufacturing process.  And, however the operation shall be described, 
the transaction in indubitably „business‟…”  Stratton‟s Independence, Ltd. v. 
Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913).   
There are instances where courts have gone beyond the business activity 
threshold and considered additional transactions as justifiably subject to excise 
taxes.  However, in these instances, the excise always originated when the 
individual or entity engaged in some sort of action or activity.  This common 
theme of action or activity thus proves vital to determining whether a tax is a valid 
excise.   
For example, in Bromley v. McCaughn, the Supreme Court concluded that a 
tax levied upon the maker of a gift constituted a viable excise tax.  The Court 
concluded that where an individual exercised a power to give property to another, 
he or she could be subject to excise taxes.  “[The Supreme Court] has consistently 
held, almost from the foundation of the government, that a tax imposed upon a 
particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incident 
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to ownership [can justifiably be categorized as an excise].”  Bromley v. McCaughn, 
280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929).  Similarly, in Murphy v. I.R.S., an en banc panel of the 
D.C. Circuit held that a tax on an individual‟s award of compensatory damages 
was a valid excise tax on the basis that the award was incident to the exercise of a 
particular right.  Murphy v. I.R.S. 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
In Murphy, the court considered whether the tax on compensatory damages 
for mental pain and suffering was “more akin, on the one hand, to a capitation or a 
tax upon one‟s ownership of property, or, on the other hand, more like a tax upon a 
use of property, a privilege, an activity or a transaction.”  Murphy, 493 F.3d at 184.  
Concluding the tax applied only after the individual engaged in a transaction, 
which occurred in this case at the time she received a compensatory award, the 
Court considered whether the tax could be justified as an excise.  Noting the 
individual didn‟t receive her damages “pursuant to a business activity,” the Court 
looked to whether the individual exercised a power “incident to ownership.”  
Murphy, 493 F.3d at 185.  The individual was “taxed only after she received a 
compensatory award which makes the tax seem to be laid on a transaction.”  
Murphy, 493 F.3d at 184.  The taxation of proceeds received from an award of 
compensatory damages could be favorably compared to a situation where the 
individual exercised a statutory right or a privilege.  This exercise of a right or 
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privilege was crucial to the Court‟s ultimate conclusion that the gift tax passed 
constitutional muster.  
Further reinforcing the principle that action or activity is a necessary 
component to an excise, the Supreme Court has stated, “[Excise taxes] were used 
comprehensively to cover customs and excise duties imposed on importation, 
consumption, manufacture and the sale of certain commodities, privileges, 
particular business transactions, vocations, occupations and the like.”  Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937), (quoting Thomas v. United 
States, 192 U.S. 363, 370 (1904)). 
The penalty provision does not fall within this framework.  Section 5000A 
imposes a penalty upon the individual who elects not to purchase health insurance.  
Consider the common thread and rationale in binding precedent.  In all of these 
cases, an individual engaged in some sort of action.  Excise taxes are permissible 
when the individual sells a business, purchases a product, exercises a power over 
property or exercises a given right.  A tax cannot be properly qualified as an excise 
when it involves the absence of action.   
Simply labeling the penalty provision an excise tax does not suffice and 
efforts to characterize it as a valid excise must be rejected.     
 
 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/11/2011     Page: 30 of 40
22 
 
B. The Penalty Provision Is Not A Constitutional Income Tax. 
 
 The 16
th
 Amendment authorizes taxation upon income without 
apportionment, “The Congress has the power to lay and collect taxes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration.”  U.S. Const. Amend. XVI.  
Admittedly, this conferral vests Congress with broad authority to determine what 
constitutes “income.”  However, this power is not absolute.  In order to be 
qualified as “income,” an individual or entity must realize a gain.   
Instructive in any analysis and application of the 16
th
 Amendment is the 
seminal case Eisner v. Macomber where the Supreme Court, when considering the 
constitutionality of an income tax on stock dividends, stated, “it becomes essential 
to distinguish between what is and what is not „income,‟ as the term is there used; 
and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, 
without regard to form.”  Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920).  The 
Court continued, “Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the 
matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it 
derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be 
lawfully exercised.”  Eisner, 252 U.S. at 206.  The 16th Amendment did not 
“extend the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which 
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otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the States of taxes laid on 
income.”  Eisner, 252 U.S. at 206.  
 The Amendment‟s language specifies that, to be subject to its mandates, the 
tax must originate from (1) a “source” and (2) it must be “derived.”  The penalty 
provision does not tax any income or gain.  In fact, there is no source of income 
and income is not derived.  Consider the language of Chief Justice Earl Warren 
when he described income: “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and 
over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”  Commissioner v. Glenshaw 
Glass Co. 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).  In this case, the Supreme Court concluded 
that, to be considered income and hence subject to taxation under the 16
th
 
Amendment, there must be some sort of realization event.  The income had to be 
“clearly realized.”    
Similarly, in Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., the Supreme 
Court determined that a loan did not constitute income.  “The economic benefit of 
a loan, however, consists entirely of the opportunity to earn income on the use of 
the money prior to the time the loan must be repaid.  And in that context our 
system is content to tax these earnings as they are realized.”  Commissioner v. 
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203, 208 (1990).  The Court continues, 
“We recognize [Indianapolis Power & Light] derives an economic benefit from 
these deposits.  But a taxpayer does not realize taxable income from every event 
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that improves his economic condition.”  Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 
at 214.   
 Under Section 5000A, the federal government argues a tax will be incurred 
for electing not to purchase health insurance.  For income tax purposes, there is no 
realization event and there isn‟t any derived income.  The individual hasn‟t taken 
any affirmative action to realize any gain.  His or her economic situation may 
improve as a result of electing not to purchase health insurance, but there isn‟t a 
realization event and hence no quantifiable income.     
C. The Penalty Provision Is Readily Distinguishable From The Social 
Security Act. 
 
Efforts to justify the penalty provision as constitutionally permissible under 
the rational used to uphold the Social Security Act fail for a number of reasons.  
First, many individuals subject to the penalty provision pay a flat amount whereas 
individuals who pay the Social Security tax pay a percent of earnings.  Second, the 
Social Security or FICA tax is directly linked to wages and earnings where the 
penalty provision is simply measured by household income – there is no reference 
in the statute to what is being taxed.  Thus, unlike the FICA tax, there is no specific 
type of income being taxed.  Third, and most importantly, the penalty provision 
provides the individual with nothing whereas FICA tax provides income when the 
individual reaches a predetermined age or becomes disabled.  See, Steven J. Willis 
and Nakku Chung, “Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare,” 2010 TNT 133-
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6, July 13, 2010.  As explained by Professor Willis and Mr. Chung, those who pay 
the amounts dictated by the penalty provision “receive no insurance in exchange 
for their payments.  Indeed, no one subject to the [penalty provision] receives 
anything other than the guarantee that when they become ill, they can purchase 
insurance despite having a preexisting condition.”  Id.  Further, the penalty 
provision, unlike the FICA tax, is not indexed to any level of benefits.  Under the 
Social Security Act, those who pay larger amounts receive greater benefits, the 
penalty provision does not provide any additional benefit (nor can it) to those who 
are penalized in larger amounts.  Id.    
These characteristics are more indicative of a capitation tax rather than an 
income tax.  Although the penalty provision is tied to the income tax – i.e., its rates 
are partially tied to income – it also has a flat rate component.  Coupled with the 
above characteristics, this indicates that the penalty provision constitutes a 
capitation tax.  As demonstrated below, such a tax is prohibited unless apportioned 
among the states. 
D. Article I, § 9 Cl. 4 Prohibits The Issuance Of Capitation Or Direct 
Taxes Unless Apportioned Among The States. 
 
 Article I, § 9 Cl. 4 of the Constitution prohibits the levying of capitation or 
direct taxes unless apportioned among the states, “No Capitation, or other direct, 
Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before 
directed to be taken.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 Cl. 4.  The Apportionment Clause was 
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an impediment to congressional attempts to establish income taxes by statute and 
not constitutional amendment.  The Supreme Court relied on this limitation on 
direct taxation when it invalidated an income tax on real estate and taxes on the 
income of personal property.  Pollock v. Farmers‟ Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 
429 (1895).      
In a subsequent decision, Pollock v. Farmers‟ Loan and Trust Co. II, the 
Supreme Court recognized the plenary power of Congress to lay taxes apportioned 
among the states.  “The power to lay direct taxes apportioned among the several 
states in proportion to their representation based on population as ascertained by 
the census, was plenary and absolute; but to lay direct taxes without apportionment 
was forbidden.”  Pollock v. Farmers‟ Loan and Trust Co.,158 U.S. 601, 618 
(1895).  The Court then discussed the constitutional prohibition upon direct taxes – 
absent apportionment: “The Constitution ordains affirmatively that representatives 
and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
numbers, and negatively that no direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the 
enumeration.”  Pollock, 158 U.S. at 621.  
 It is universally recognized that the Pollock decisions help spur the issuance 
and passage of the 16
th
 Amendment.  See Steven J. Willis and Nakku Chung, 
“Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare,” 2010 TNT 133-6, July 13, 2010.  
After the 16
th
 Amendment‟s ratification, direct taxes, levied without 
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apportionment, were constitutionally permissible; however, income had to 
originate from a source and had to be derived.  Certain modern commentators 
believe the 16
th
 Amendment essentially invalidated Article I, § 9 Cl. 4 but recent 
case law continues to recognize its constraints.  
 Consider the recent case of Murphy v. I.R.S.  An en banc panel of the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to adopt the federal government‟s arguments that 
“only „taxes that are capable of apportionment in the first instance, specifically, 
capitation taxes and taxes on land,‟ are direct taxes.”  Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 
170, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  In short, the government posited arguments that Article 
I, § 9 Cl. 4 has been supplanted by the 16
th
 Amendment.  The Court concluded 
otherwise when it stated, “…[N]either need we adopt the Government‟s position 
that direct taxes are only those capable of satisfying the constraint of 
apportionment.  In the abstract, such a constraint is no constraint at all; virtually 
any tax may be apportioned by establishing different rates in different states.”  
Murphy, 493 F.3d at 184.  As stated earlier in this brief, the Court looked to 
whether the tax at issue was more “akin” to a direct tax or “more like a tax upon a 
use of property, a privilege, an activity, or a transaction.”  Murphy, 493 F.3d at 
184.  The Court concluded the tax at issue (a tax on compensatory damages for 
mental pain and suffering) qualified as a justifiable excise tax.  It didn‟t determine 
whether this tax would have passed muster as a justifiable direct tax.  However, by 
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relying on the principles espoused in Pollock, the Court indicated the constitutional 
constraints imposed by Article I, § 9 Cl. 4 continue to be valid.       
 
E. The Penalty Provision Constitutes An Impermissible Direct Tax 
Because It Is Not Apportioned Among The States. 
  
The penalty provision does not pass muster as either an excise tax or an 
income tax.  By elimination, the only safe harbor available is a successful 
justification of the provision as a direct tax.  However, there has been no effort to 
apportion the penalty provision among the states.  It therefore fails this 
constitutional mandate.  The fact is that if Congress wanted to impose a tax, it 
would have done so – as it has myriad times throughout history.  It chose not to, 
yet the Executive Branch argues the contrary.   
If the Court were to justify the penalty provision by determining it 
constitutes a valid tax, the federal government‟s taxation power would be without 
limits.  In essence, the government is taxing an individual who has taken no action.  
He has not purchased a good or service. He has not realized an economic gain.   He 
has not received anything.  He has not produced anything.    The federal 
government seeks refuge in the General Welfare Clause, but the constitutional 
constraints of Article I, § 9 Cl. 4, the 16
th
 Amendment, and existing case law 
expose its folly.  The penalty provision fails to qualify as constitutional tax under 
any scenario and the District Court's decision should be upheld.  
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III. CONCLUSION 
 The federal government asks this Court to ignore the history of the 
Commerce Clause, Supreme Court precedent relating to the Commerce Clause, 
and both logic and common sense respecting the nature of commerce itself. 
The provisions of the PPACA discussed at length in this brief represent an 
enormous and unprecedented attempt to expand federal power over American 
citizens.  If these provisions are upheld as constitutional, the federal government‟s 
authority to regulate citizen activity (or non-activity) under the Commerce Clause 
and its authority to levy taxes under the General Welfare Clause will be limitless.   
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